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The growth in the number of noncitizens in immigration detention in the 
United States over the past two decades is striking. In 1994 the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS) detained approximately 6,000 noncitizens 
a day in immigration detention, and annual detention capacity was just over 
100,000. In less than two decades, that annual detention capacity has qua-
drupled. In fiscal year 2011, approximately 429,000 people were confined in 
an immigration detention facility. The number of noncitizens detained on 
any given day now tops 30,000 and has for several years. The length of stay 
for an immigrant in detention varies widely, but one snapshot taken on Janu-
ary 25, 2009, revealed that the average stay for detainees present on that date 
was eighty-one days (Kerwin and Lin 2009). Some immigrants are detained 
much longer.
The growth in immigration detention is intertwined with, but not fully 
explained by, national security concerns. The US government certainly used 
immigration detention as a way to address widespread concern over national 
security in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attack on the United States by 
al-Qaeda. Thousands of Arabs and Muslims were placed in immigration 
detention for technical violations of their immigrant and nonimmigrant 
visas, notwithstanding the lack of evidence that these detainees posed any 
actual risk to national security. The events of September 11 also prompted the 
implementation of long-contemplated changes to the federal bureaucracies 
responsible for immigration enforcement and detention. Congressional legis-
lation created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the INS was 
broken up into three separate agencies that operate, along with other agen-
cies like the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Coast Guard, 
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under the umbrella of the DHS. Since that reorganization, Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) has overseen immigration detention.
The frenzy of detentions after September 11 was striking in its 
unabashed reliance on racial and religious profiling, but it does not explain 
either the current size of the United States’ detained immigrant population 
or the longevity of the detention boom. Detention figures actually began to 
swell after 1996, in response to changes in the law that vastly expanded the 
number of noncitizens subject to mandatory detention during removal pro-
ceedings. As Margaret Taylor (2005: 345) notes, “The detention mandate that 
ultimately became [Immigration and Nationality Act] § 236(c) was inserted 
without study into omnibus legislation that Congress was in a hurry to pass. 
And the statute was widely considered by experts inside and outside the gov-
ernment to be unduly harsh, unrealistic and unwise.” The legal changes 
enacted by Congress in 1996 drove a doubling of the detained immigrant 
population from 1996 to 2000.
The next significant spike in detention figures occurred in 2007. In 
late 2005 President George W. Bush declared that his administration was 
working to end “catch and release” policies at the border. He announced that 
migrants coming into the United States without authorization would be 
detained and formally removed rather than simply turned back. Congress 
also provided substantial resources in this period to increase immigration 
enforcement and detention capacity. In 2007, for the first time, the number 
of people in immigration detention topped thirty thousand a day (Kerwin 
and Lin 2009: 6). The numbers have not dipped below thirty thousand since 
that time. The majority of immigration detainees in the United States are 
from Mexico and Central America. A January 25, 2009, snapshot showed 37 
percent of detainees were from Mexico, 28 percent from Central America, 7 
percent from the Caribbean, and 6 percent from South America (12).
Immigration detention in the United States is “civil” detention. As a 
legal matter, this means that an individual placed in immigration deten-
tion is not entitled to the same protections that would apply if he or she 
were being incarcerated for a crime. Individuals charged with crimes, 
whether citizens or not, have constitutional protections against lengthy 
pretrial detentions. They also have a right to counsel at the government’s 
expense to assist in their defense. In contrast, immigration detention is 
not subject to the same set of procedural protections. The Supreme Court 
clearly articulated this distinction in the 1896 case of Wong Wing v. United 
States, in which the Court distinguished between “detention or temporary 
confinement, as part of the means necessary to give effect to the provisions 
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for the exclusion or expulsion of aliens,” and a sentence of a year at hard 
labor. The Court concluded that the former was “not imprisonment in a 
legal sense,” whereas the latter was and therefore was subject to the proce-
dural protections of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments (Wong Wing v. 
United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896)). In this legal construction, immigration 
detention is simply a holding mechanism used to allow the government to 
effectuate its civil immigration enforcement goals. It is not punitive in 
nature. Thus immigrant detainees are accorded minimal due process pro-
tections by courts, and courts largely look to congressional legislation to 
determine what process is due.
The legal conclusion that immigration detention is not punitive is 
essential to its operation in its current form. Because immigration detention 
is not treated under the law as a criminal punishment, immigrants are fre-
quently detained pending removal proceedings in the absence of any indi-
vidualized showing that the immigrant poses a danger to the community 
or is a flight risk. Indeed, this is precisely what the 1996 amendments to the 
Immigration and Nationality Act’s detention provisions were designed to 
achieve. Categorical pretrial detention of this nature would be unconstitu-
tional in the criminal setting. It is permitted for immigrant detainees.
The glaring problem with the legal doctrine that constructs immigra-
tion detention as nonpunitive is that it is a fiction. Detention is punitive, and 
it is experienced as such by immigrants. Immigrants in detention feel the 
punitive force of separation from families, inadequate conditions of deten-
tion, demeaning treatment, and lack of easy access to medical services. For 
some, the results are deadly; over one hundred inmates died in immigration 
detention between 2003 and 2009 (Bernstein 2010). Moreover, immigrant 
detainees are frequently housed in the same facilities as criminal offenders, 
and under the same conditions. A 2009 report by Dora Schriro, who at the 
time was a senior official at the Department of Homeland Security, con-
cluded that the vast majority of immigration detainees were detained under 
punitive conditions inappropriate for civil detainees. Although ICE subse-
quently committed to expanding bed space available in more “civil” deten-
tion spaces, the vast majority of immigrant detainees continue to spend their 
time in jails and jail-like facilities (Human Rights First 2011). Moreover, 
despite efforts to elaborate civil standards for detention, ICE and DHS stan-
dards for detention, including those that articulate standards for populations 
with special needs, continue to be modeled on standards created for prisons 
and jails. These standards therefore require more restrictions than would be 
necessary for truly civil detention (Human Rights First 2011).
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The legal conclusion that immigration detention is not punitive helps 
explain why courts do not evaluate immigration detention in the same way 
that they evaluate criminal punishment, but it does not explain why, as a 
policy matter, immigration detention came to be such a prominent feature 
of the US penal landscape. It is worth asking how this happened.
Perhaps it is no surprise that a society that relies so heavily on incar-
ceration to address problems of crime and general social disorder would 
turn to the same model to handle concerns about migration. The United 
States does, after all, lead the free world in its prison population rate. High 
levels of incarceration in the United States—including the widespread incar-
ceration of low-level offenders and nonviolent drug offenders—have been 
the subject of intense study and debate for decades. Scholars have proposed 
several explanations for the phenomenal growth of incarceration and the 
underlying “tough on crime” policies that generated both mass incarcera-
tion and expansions of other forms of social control. Explanations include 
concern generated by rising crime rates (real and perceived), the federaliza-
tion of criminal law, racism, cultural anxieties, and the economic interests of 
security firms, prison guards, unions, and the like. Many of these explana-
tions also seem useful in assessing the rise of immigration detention.
Certainly many of the same actors that benefited economically from 
the nation’s commitment to criminal incarceration continue to benefit from 
the expansion of immigration detention. Indeed, since the recession of 2008, 
numerous states and localities have opted to cut back on the use of expensive 
incarceration options in the criminal justice sphere. The detention industry 
has been under pressure to keep bed spaces filled in other ways. Noncitizens 
in immigration detention, whose bed space in both federally funded facili-
ties and local jails is paid for by federal dollars, neatly fill some of the voids 
created by the use of more cost-effective and less incarceration-focused alter-
natives in the criminal justice sphere.
Notwithstanding the economic motivations of some special interest 
groups, one would not assume that policy makers and the voting public 
would automatically buy into the notion that immigration violators should 
be warehoused in jails throughout the country. Unsurprisingly, the bal-
looning of immigration detention in the United States went hand in hand 
with the rise of toxic rhetoric on migrant criminality and dangerousness. 
To take just one example, Representative Orrin Hatch (R-UT), when argu-
ing in support of restrictionist amendments to the immigration laws in 
1996, proclaimed that “we can no longer afford to allow our borders to be 
just overrun by illegal aliens. . . . Frankly, a lot of our criminality in this 
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country today happens to be coming from criminal, illegal aliens who are 
ripping our country apart” (142 Cong. Rec. S11, 505 (1996)). Representative 
Hatch was far from alone, and was certainly not the worst offender, in 
using this sort of language to characterize the threat that migrants posed 
to the nation. Those kinds of statements—accusatory, inflammatory, and 
unsubstantiated—came to dominate political discourse and media repre-
sentations of migrants in the decade that followed.
Such rhetoric rendered the use of criminal-style detention for migrants 
an obvious solution to a phenomenon that was presented as a pressing social 
problem. Over time, it also inexorably led to more aggressive reliance on 
actual criminal prosecution for migration-related offenses. Immigration-
related prosecutions now make up the single largest category of federal pros-
ecutions each year—over 40 percent of the federal criminal docket (US 
Department of Justice 2012). Nor are such prosecutions limited to the fed-
eral criminal justice system. Notwithstanding formal legal doctrine that 
denies state and local governments a role in immigration enforcement (Ari-
zona v. United States, 567 U.S. ____132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012)), some states and 
localities rely on criminal regulations such as document fraud provisions to 
prosecute and incarcerate noncitizens working without authorization. 
Human trafficking restrictions have also come to operate as a way to crimi-
nalize migrants at the state level—a somewhat ironic development given the 
purportedly humanitarian purposes of antitrafficking laws.
In other words, the growth and normalization of immigration deten-
tion is just one feature of a much broader integration of civil immigration 
enforcement and the criminal justice system. Both the civil and the crimi-
nal justice systems have been affected adversely by this integration. On the 
civil side, increasingly punitive measures are imposed without the consti-
tutional protections afforded to criminal defendants. And on the criminal 
side, procedural protections that generally apply to all defendants—such 
as pretrial release on bond and a right to individual adjudication—have 
been stripped away in some cases involving noncitizens. Noncitizens in the 
criminal justice system are thereby at times denied standard procedural pro-
tections, while noncitizens outside the criminal justice system are some-
times subjected to punishment by another name and without the proce-
dural rights that punishment entails.
In recent years, the wave of panic over migrant criminality has sub-
sided to a certain degree in the United States. In this slightly more tolerant 
cultural climate, President Barack Obama’s administration has taken some 
specific steps to reform immigration detention. But these ongoing reforms 
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have been insufficient to address the deep, systemic problems of immigra-
tion detention, let alone broader immigration enforcement problems. First, 
as Anil Kalhan (2010) notes, reforms to date still have done nothing to 
address some of the most pressing problems of immigration detention, 
including prolonged detention, detention of populations that do not need to 
be detained, and insufficient reductions in the severity of detention condi-
tions. Second, efforts to improve conditions of detention through the enact-
ment of new policy guidelines raise the bar for governmental performance 
in immigration detention, but do very little to increase the accountability of 
the government to its immigrant detainees. No administration to date has 
enacted binding and enforceable detention standards, and no viable immi-
gration reform proposal contains such a requirement. Immigration deten-
tion guidelines ultimately rely for their enforcement on the government’s 
own goodwill and the possibility of pressure from a distractible public.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, immigration detention reform 
efforts to date have not been tethered to appropriate efforts to decriminalize 
and rationalize immigration enforcement. Kalhan (2010) argues that “the 
excessive, quasi-punitive nature of detention today arises from more than 
the inadequate conditions of confinement that these [reform] initiatives prin-
cipally target. . . . Absent more fundamental reconsideration of immigration 
control policies premised upon convergence with criminal enforcement, 
fully realizing ‘fairness and humanity’ will remain an aspiration in tension 
with ‘toughness’ that has dominated immigration policy in recent years.” 
More generally, as long as the United States remains committed to its cur-
rent course of deporting as many of its eleven million unauthorized nonciti-
zens as is possible in any given year, rates of detention will remain high, and 
resources that might be used to improve conditions of detention are more 
likely to be used to expand the scope of detention.
Broader immigration reform proposals such as S. 744, the compre-
hensive immigration reform bill passed by the Senate in 2013, seek to 
address this problem by creating legalization mechanisms that will reduce 
the pool of noncitizens eligible for deportation while incorporating specific 
measures intended to remediate directly some of the harsh effects of 
immigration detention. These proposals have the potential to shrink the 
size of the detained immigrant population and to improve the conditions 
of detention for migrants who are detained. Indeed, the companies that 
profit from US immigration detention have noted the potentially deleteri-
ous effects that immigration reform would have on their profits (GEO’s 
SEC Form S-4, quoted in García Hernández 2013). However, these reform 
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proposals also suggest the extent to which the tide of fear over immigra-
tion has not fully subsided in the United States. These fears are illustrated 
not only by the “border security” provisions, which would require the out-
lay of some $46 billion in border security–related expenditures, but also by 
the more benign elements of the reform proposal.
The legalization program, with its lengthy waiting period, would 
greatly increase the number of noncitizens in a vulnerable, liminal status. 
The road to citizenship would be quite long under the Senate’s bill. It would 
take at least thirteen years for most eligible immigrants to acquire that sta-
tus, and eligible noncitizens would need to remain employed and out of trou-
ble with the law to obtain that status. Their eventual ability to acquire citi-
zenship therefore will depend on the goodwill of their employers and on the 
nature of their interactions with local law enforcement, whose variable prac-
tices in the policing of immigrant neighborhoods will undoubtedly affect 
naturalization outcomes. All of this will mean that the need for immigration 
detention will not go away. Detention awaits as a possible destination for 
many of the individuals living under surveillance on the long road to 
citizenship.
The Senate did acknowledge the need to mitigate the harsher effects 
of detention in its reform bill. The bill therefore creates some new require-
ments for representation in detention as well as alternatives to detention. 
For example, the bill mandates access to counsel for special-needs popula-
tions such as juveniles and the mentally disabled—welcome and necessary 
changes to current immigration laws. Proposed reforms would also help 
individuals outside these special-needs populations. Individuals deemed by 
the DHS to pose a lesser risk of flight or danger will be allowed to take advan-
tage of detention alternatives like electronic monitoring. Such reforms prom-
ise significant benefits, not least of which would be a possible reduction in the 
overdetention of low-risk immigrants in removal proceedings. On the other 
hand, as Mark Noferi and Robert Koulish (2013) have argued, the DHS’s risk 
assessment tools still may be weighted toward overdetention, and alternatives 
to detention will likely be used not on individuals who would otherwise be 
detained but instead on individuals who would otherwise be outside the net 
of immigration detention altogether. Alternatives to detention may well 
widen the net of social control over immigrants in the United States.
In the end, notwithstanding the apparent trend in favor of immigra-
tion reform, fear of uncontrolled migrant bodies remains sufficiently strong 
that all viable reform proposals continue to assume the need for punitive 
detention for migrants as part of a criminalized immigration enforcement 
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model. Ongoing and proposed reforms to immigration detention in particu-
lar, and to immigration law in general, reveal just how far the United States 
is from immigration reform that is truly comprehensive. 
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